Quantum computers can break the RSA and El Gamal public-key cryptosystems, since they can factor integers and extract discrete logarithms. If we believe that quantum computers will someday become a reality, we would like to have post-quantum cryptosystems which can be implemented today with classical computers, but which will remain secure even in the presence of quantum attacks.
Introduction
Considering that common public-key cryptosystems such as RSA and El Gamal are insecure against quantum attacks, the susceptibility of other well-studied public-key systems to such attacks is naturally of fundamental interest. In this article we present evidence for the strength of the McEliece cryptosystem against quantum attacks, demonstrating that the quantum Fourier sampling attacks that cripple RSA and El Gamal do not apply to the McEliece system coupled with well-permuted, well-scrambled linear codes. While our results do not rule out other quantum (or classical) attacks, they do demonstrate security against the hidden subgroup methods that have proven so powerful for computational number theory. Additionally, we partially extend results of Kempe et al. [8] concerning the subgroups of S n reconstructible by quantum Fourier sampling.
The McEliece cryptosystem. This public-key cryptosystem was proposed by McEliece in 1978 [11] , and is typically built over Goppa codes. There are two basic types of attacks known against the McEliece cryptosystem: ciphertext only attacks, and attacks on the private key. The former is unlikely to work because it relies on solving the general decoding problem, which is NP-hard. The latter can be successful on certain classes of linear codes, and is our focus. In the McEliece cryptosystem, the private key of a user Alice consists of three matrices: a k × n generator matrix M of a hidden q-ary [n, k]-linear code, an invertible k × k matrix A over the finite field F q , and an n × n permutation matrix P. Both matrices A and P are selected randomly. Alice's public key includes the matrix M * = AMP, which is a generator matrix of a linear code equivalent to the secret code. An adversary may attack the private key by first computing the secret generator matrix M, and then computing 1 the secret row "scrambler" A and the secret permutation P.
There have been some successful attacks on McEliece-type public-key systems. A notable one is Sidelnokov and Shestakov's attack [19] , which efficiently computes the matrices A and MP from the public matrix AMP, in the case that the secret code is a generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) code. Note that this attack does not reveal the secret permutation. An attack in which the secret permutation is revealed was proposed by Loidreau and Sendrier [9] . However, this attack only works with a very limited subclass of classical binary Goppa codes, namely those with a binary generator polynomial.
Although the McEliece cryptosystem is efficient and still considered (classically) secure [3] , it is rarely used in practice because of the comparatively large public key (see remark 8.33 in [12] ). The discovery of successful quantum attacks on RSA and El Gamal, however, have changed the landscape: as suggested by Ryan [17] and Bernstein et al. [2] , the McEliece cryptosystem could become a "post-quantum" alternative to RSA.
Quantum Fourier sampling. Quantum Fourier Sampling (QFS) is a key ingredient in most efficient algebraic quantum algorithms, including Shor's algorithms for factorization and discrete logarithm [18] and Simon's algorithm [20] . In particular, Shor's algorithm relies on quantum Fourier sampling over the cyclic group Z N , while Simon's algorithm uses quantum Fourier sampling over Z n 2 . In general, these algorithms solve instances of the Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP) over a finite group G. Given a function f on G whose level sets are left cosets of some unknown subgroup H < G, i.e., such that f is constant on each left coset of H and distinct on different left cosets, they find a set of generators for the subgroup H.
The standard approach to this problem treats f as a black box and applies f to a uniform superposition over G, producing the coset state |cH = ( 1 / |H|) ∑ h∈H |ch for a random c. We then measure |cH in a Fourier basis {|ρ, i, j } for the space C [G] , where ρ is an irrep 2 of G and i, j are row and column indices of a matrix ρ(g). In the weak form of Fourier sampling, only the representation name ρ is measured, while in the strong form, both the representation name and the matrix indices are measured. This produces probability distributions from which classical information can be extracted to recover the subgroup H. Moreover, since |cH is block-diagonal in the Fourier basis, the optimal measurement of the coset state can always be described in terms of strong Fourier sampling.
Understanding the power of Fourier sampling in nonabelian contexts has been an ongoing project, and a sequence of negative results [5, 13, 6] have suggested that the approach is inherently limited when the underlying groups are rich enough. In particular, Moore, Russell, and Schulman [13] showed that over the symmetric group, even the strong form of Fourier sampling cannot efficiently distinguish the conjugates of most order-2 subgroups from each other or from the trivial subgroup. That is, for any σ ∈ S n with large support, and most π ∈ S n , if H = {1, π −1 σ π} then strong Fourier sampling, and therefore any measurement we can perform on the coset state, yields a distribution which is exponentially close to the distribution corresponding to H = {1}. This result implies that the GRAPH ISOMORPHISM cannot be solved by the naive reduction to strong Fourier sampling. Hallgren et al. [6] strengthened these results, demonstrating that even entangled measurements on o(log n!) coset states result in essentially information-free outcome distributions. Kempe and Shalev [7] showed that weak Fourier sampling single coset states in S n cannot distinguish the trivial subgroup from larger subgroups H with polynomial size and non-constant minimal degree. 3 They conjectured, conversely, that if a subgroup H < S n can be distinguished from the trivial subgroup by weak Fourier sampling, then the minimal degree of H must be constant. Their conjecture was later proved by Kempe, Pyber, and Shalev [8] .
Our contributions
To state our results, we say that a subgroup H < G is indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling if the conjugate subgroups g −1 Hg cannot be distinguished from each other or from the trivial subgroup by measuring the coset state in an arbitrary Fourier basis. A precise definition is presented in Section 3.2. Since the optimal measurement of a coset state can always be expressed as an instance of strong Fourier sampling, these results imply that no measurement of a single coset state yields any useful information about H. Based on the strategy of Moore, Russell, and Schulman [13] , we first develop a general framework, formalized in Theorem 4, to determine indistinguishability of a subgroup by strong Fourier sampling. We emphasize that their results cover the case where the subgroup has order two. Our principal contribution is to show how to extend their methods to more general subgroups.
We then apply this general framework to a class of semi-direct products (GL k (F q ) × S n ) ≀ Z 2 , bounding the distinguishability for the HSP corresponding to the private-key attack on the McEliece cryptosystem, i.e., the problem of determining A and P from M * and M. Our bound, given in Corrolary 9 of Theorem 8, depends on the minimal degree and the size of the automorphism group of the secret code, as well as on the column rank of the secret generator matrix. In particular, the rational Goppa codes have good values for these quantities, i.e., they have small automorphism groups with large minimal degree, and have generator matrices of full rank. In general, our result indicates that the McEliece cryptosystem resists all known attacks based on strong Fourier sampling if its secret q-ary [n, k]-code (i) is well-permuted, i.e., its automorphism group has minimal degree Ω(n) and size e o(n) , and (ii) is well-scrambled, i.e., it has a generator matrix of rank at least k − o( √ n). Here, we assume q k 2 ≤ n 0.2n , which implies log |GL k (F q )| = O(n log n), so that Alice 2 Throughout the paper, we write "irrep" as short for "irreducible representation". 3 The minimal degree of a permutation group H is the minimal number of points moved by a non-identity element of H.
only needs to flip O(n log n) bits to pick a random matrix A from GL k (F q ). Thus she needs only O(n log n) coin flips overall to generate her private key. While our main application is the security of the McEliece cryptosystem, we show in addition that our general framework is applicable to other classes of groups with simpler structure, including the symmetric group and the finite general linear group GL 2 (F q ). For the symmetric group, we extend the results of [13] to larger subgroups of S n . Specifically, we show that any subgroup H < S n with minimal degree m ≥ Θ(log |H|) + ω(log n) is indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling over S n . In other words, if the conjugates of H can be distinguished from each other-or from the trivial subgroup-by strong Fourier sampling, then the minimum degree of H must be O(log |H|) + O(log n). This partially extends the results of Kempe et al. [8] , which apply only to weak Fourier sampling.
We go on to demonstrate another application of our general framework for the general linear group GL 2 (F q ), giving the first negative result regarding the power of strong Fourier sampling over GL 2 (F q ). We show that any subgroup H < GL 2 (F q ) that does not contain non-identity scalar matrices and has order |H| ≤ q δ for some δ < 1/2 is indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling. Examples of such subgroups are those generated by a constant number of triangular unipotent matrices.
Remark Our results show that the natural reduction of McEliece to a hidden subgroup problem yields negligible information about the secret key. Thus they rule out the direct analogue of the quantum attack that breaks, for example, RSA. Our results are quite flexible in this hidden-subgroup context: they apply equally well to any HSP reduction resulting in a rich subgroup of GL 2 (F q ), which seems to be the natural arena for the McEliece system.
Of course, our results do not rule out other quantum (or classical) attacks. Neither do they establish that a quantum algorithm for the McEliece cryptosystem would violate a natural hardness assumption, as do recent lattice cryptosystem constructions whose hardness is based on the Learning With Errors problem (e.g. Regev [15] ). Nevertheless, they indicate that any such algorithm would have to use rather different ideas than those that have been proposed so far.
Summary of technical ideas
Let G be a finite group. We wish to establish general criteria for indistinguishability of subgroups H < G by strong Fourier sampling. We begin with the general strategy, developed in [13] , that controls the resulting probability distributions in terms of the representation-theoretic properties of G. In order to handle richer subgroups, however, we have to overcome some technical difficulties. Our principal contribution here is a "decoupling" lemma that allows us to handle the cross terms arising from pairs of nontrivial group elements.
Roughly, the approach (presented in Section 3.2) identifies two disjoint subsets, SMALL and LARGE, of irreps of G. The set LARGE consists of all irreps whose dimensions are no smaller than a certain threshold D. While D should be as large as possible, we also need to choose D small enough so that the set LARGE is large. In contrast, the representations in SMALL must have small dimension (much smaller than √ D), and the set SMALL should be small or contain few irreps that appear in the decomposition of the tensor product representation ρ ⊗ ρ * for any ρ ∈ LARGE. In addition, any irrep ρ outside SMALL must have small normalized character |χ ρ (h)|/d ρ for any nontrivial element h ∈ H. If there are such two sets SMALL and LARGE, and if the order of H is sufficiently small, then H is indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling over G.
In the case G = GL 2 (F q ), for instance, we choose SMALL as the set of all linear representations and set the threshold D = q − 1. The key lemma we need to prove is then that for any nonlinear irrep ρ of GL 2 (F q ), the decomposition of ρ ⊗ ρ * contains at most two inequivalent linear representations. (Lemma 11). In the case G = S n , we choose SMALL as the set Λ c of all Young diagrams with at least (1 − c)n rows or at least (1 − c)n columns, and set D = n dn , for reasonable constants 0 < c, d < 1. For this case, we use the same techniques as in [13] .
For the case G = (GL k (F q ) × S n ) ≀ Z 2 corresponding to the McEliece cryptosystem, the normalized characters on the hidden subgroup K depend on the minimal degree of the automorphism group Aut(C), where C is the secret code. Moreover, |K| depends on |Aut(C)| and the column rank of the secret generator matrix. Now we can choose SMALL as the set of all irreps constructed from tensor product representations τ × λ of GL k (F q ) × S n with λ ∈ Λ c . Then the "small" features of Λ c will induce the "small" features of this set SMALL. To show that any irrep outside SMALL has small normalized characters on K, we show that any Young diagram λ outside Λ c has large dimension (Lemma 17).
Hidden Subgroup Attack Against McEliece Cryptosystems

An attack via the hidden shift problem
As mentioned in the Introduction, we consider the attack that involves finding the secret scrambler and permutation in a McEliece private key.
Scrambler-Permutation Problem
Given two k × n generator matrices M and M * of two equivalent linear codes over F q , the task is to find a matrix A ∈ GL k (F q ) and an n × n permutation P matrix such that M * = AMP.
The decision version of this problem, known as CODE EQUIVALENCE problem, is not easier than GRAPH ISOMORPHISM, although it is unlikely to be NP-complete [14] . The only known way to solve the Scrambler-Permutation problem using quantum Fourier sampling is to reduce it to a Hidden Shift Problem, which in turn can be reduced to a Hidden Subgroup Problem over a wreath product.
Hidden Shift Problem Let G be a finite group and Σ be some finite set. Given two functions f 0 : G → Σ and f 1 : G → Σ on G, we call an element s ∈ G a left shift from f 0 to f 1 (or simply, a shift) if f 0 (sx) = f 1 (x) for all x ∈ G. We are promised that there is such a shift. Find a shift.
The Scrambler-Permutation Problem is reduced to the Hidden Shift Problem over group G = GL k (F q ) × S n by defining functions f 0 and f 1 
Here and from now on, we identify each n × n permutation matrix as its corresponding permutation in S n . Apparently, AMP = M * if and only if (A −1 , P) is a shift from f 0 to f 1 .
Reduction from the hidden shift problem to the hidden subgroup problem
We present how to reduce the Hidden Shift Problem over group G to the HSP on the wreath product G ≀ Z 2 , which can also be written as a semi-direct product G 2 ⋊ Z 2 associated with the action of Z 2 on G 2 in which the non-identity element of Z 2 acts on G 2 by swapping, i.e., 1 · (x, y) = (y, x). Given two input functions f 0 and f 1 for a Hidden Shift Problem on G, we define the function f :
We want to determine the subgroup whose cosets are distinguished by f . Recall that a function f on a group G distinguishes the right cosets of a subgroup H < G if for all x, y ∈ G,
Definition. Let f be a function on a group G. We say that the function f is injective under right multiplica-
Define the subset G| f of the group G: Hence, the function f defined in (2) can distinguish the right cosets of some subgroup if and only if it is injective under right multiplication.
Lemma 2. The function f defined in (2) is injective under right multiplication if and only if f 0 is injective under right multiplication.
The proof for this lemma is straightforward on the case by case basis, so we omit it here. 
which has size 2|H 0 | 2 . Recall that the set of shifts is H 0 s.
To find a hidden shift from the hidden subgroup K = G 2 ⋊ Z 2 | f , just select an element of the form ((g 1 , g 2 ), 1) from K, then g 1 must belong to H 0 s, which is the set of all shifts.
In the case of Scrambler-Permutation problem. Back to the Hidden Shift Problem over G = GL k (F q ) × S n reduced from the Scrambler-Permutation problem, it is clear that the input function f 0 defined in (1) is injective under right multiplication and that
3 Quantum Fourier sampling (QFS)
Preliminaries and Notation
Fix a finite group G, abelian or non-abelian, and let G denote the set of (complex) irreducible representations, or "irreps" for short, of G. For each irrep ρ ∈ G, let V ρ denote a vector space over C on which ρ acts so that ρ is a group homomorphism from G to the general linear group over V ρ , and let d . This has a basis {|ρ, i, j : 
where ρ(g) i j is the (i, j)-entry of the matrix ρ(g). Alternatively, we can view F G |g as a block diagonal matrix consisting of the block
Notations. For each subset X ⊂ G, define |X = ( 1 / |X|) ∑ x∈X |x , which is the state of uniformly random element of X in the point-mass basis. For each X ⊂ G and ρ ∈ G, define the operator
and let X(ρ) denote the d ρ × d ρ matrix block at ρ in the quantum Fourier transform of |X , i.e.,
Quantum Fourier Sampling (QFS) is a standard procedure based on the Quantum Fourier Transform to solve the Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP) (see [10] for a survey). An instance of the HSP over G consists of a black-box function f : G → {0, 1} * such that f (x) = f (y) if and only if x and y belong to the same left coset of H in G, for some subgroup H ≤ G. The problem is to recover H using the oracle
The general QFS procedure for this is the following:
1. Prepare a 2-register quantum state, the first in a uniform superposition of the group elements and the second with the value zero:
2. Query f , i.e., apply the oracle O f , resulting in the state
where T is a transversal of H in G.
3. Measure the second register of |ψ 2 , resulting in the state |αH | f (α) with probability 1/|T | for each α ∈ T . The first register of the resulting state is then |αH for some uniformly random α ∈ G.
4. Apply the quantum Fourier transform over G to the coset state |αH observed at step 3: 6. Classically process the information observed from the previous step to determine the subgroup H.
Probability distributions produced by QFS. For a particular coset αH, the probability of measuring the representation ρ in the state F G |αH is
where Tr(A) denotes the trace of a matrix A, and A F := Tr(A † A) is the Frobenius norm of A. The last equality is due to the fact that
H is an orthogonal projector. Since there is no point in measuring the rows [5] , we are only concerned with measuring the columns. As pointed out in [13] , the optimal von Neumann measurement on a coset state can always be expressed in this form for some basis B ρ . Conditioned on observing ρ in the state F G |αH , the probability of measuring a given b ∈ B ρ is αH(ρ)b 2 . Hence the conditional probability that we observe the vector b, given that we observe the representation ρ, is then
where in the last equality, we use the fact that as ρ(α) is unitary, it preserves the norm of the vector Π ρ H b. The coset representative α is unknown and is uniformly distributed in T . However, both distributions P αH (ρ) and P αH (b | ρ) are independent of α and are the same as those for the state F G |H . Thus, in Step 5 of the QFS procedure above, we observe ρ ∈ G with probability P H (ρ), and conditioned on this event, we observe b ∈ B ρ with probability P H (b | ρ).
If the hidden subgroup is trivial, H = {1}, the conditional probability distribution on B ρ is uniform,
Distinguishability by QFS
We fix a finite group G and consider quantum Fourier sampling over G in the basis given by {B ρ }. For a subgroup H < G and for g ∈ G, let H g denote the conjugate subgroup g −1 Hg. Since Tr Π ρ H = Tr Π ρ H g , the probability distributions obtained by QFS for recovering the hidden subgroup H g are
As P H g (ρ) does not depend on g, weak Fourier sampling can not distinguish conjugate subgroups. Our goal is to point out that for certain nontrivial subgroup H < G, strong Fourier sampling can not efficiently distinguish the conjugates of H from each other or from the trivial one. Recall that the distribution P {1} (· | ρ) obtained by performing strong Fourier sampling on the trivial hidden subgroup is the same as the uniform distribution U B ρ on the basis B ρ . Thus, our goal can be boiled down to showing that the probability distribution P H g (· | ρ) is likely to be close to the uniform distribution U B ρ in total variation, for a random g ∈ G and an irrep ρ ∈ G obtained by weak Fourier sampling.
Definition. We define the distinguishability of a subgroup H (using strong Fourier sampling over G), denoted D H , to be the expectation of the squared L 1 -distance between P H g (· | ρ) and U B ρ :
where ρ is drawn from G according to the distribution P H (ρ), and g is chosen from G uniformly at random. We say that the subgroup
Note that if D H is small, then the total variation distance between P H g (· | ρ) and U B ρ is small with high probability due to Markov's inequality: for all ε > 0,
In particular, if the subgroup H is indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling, then for all constant c > 0,
with probability at least 1 − log −c |G| in both g and ρ. Indeed, our notion of indistinguishability is inspired by that of Kempe and Shalev [7] . Focusing on weak Fourier sampling, they say that
Our main theorem below will serve as a general guideline for bounding the distinguishability of H. For this bound, we define, for each σ ∈ G, the maximal normalized character of σ on H as
In addition, for each reducible representation ρ of G, we let I(ρ) denote the set of irreps of G that appear in the decomposition of ρ into irreps.
Then the distinguishability of H is bounded by
Intuitively, the set S consists of irreps of small dimension, and L consists of irreps of large dimension. Moreover, we wish to have that the size of S is small while the size of L is large, so that most irreps are likely in L. In the cases where there are relatively few irreps, i.e. |S| ≪ D and | G| ≪ |G|, we can simply upper bound ∆ by |S| and upper bound |L| by | G|.
We discuss the proof of this theorem in Section 5.
Applications
In this section, we point out some applications of Theorem 4 to analyze strong Fourier sampling over certain non-abelian groups.
Strong Fourier sampling over S n
In this part, we consider the case where G is the symmetric group S n . Recall that each irrep of S n is oneto-one corresponding to an integer partition λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ t ) of n, which is associated with the Young diagram of t rows in which the i th row contains λ i columns. The conjugate representation of λ is the irrep corresponding to the partition
, which is obtained by flipping the Young diagram λ about the diagonal. In particular, λ ′ 1 = t and t ′ = λ 1 . As in [13] , we use Roichman's upper bound [16] on normalized characters.
Theorem 5 (Roichman's Theorem [16] ). There exist constant b > 0 and 0 < q < 1 so that for n > 4, for every π ∈ S n , and for every irrep λ of S n ,
where
This bound works well for unbalanced Young diagrams. In particular, for a constant 0 < c < 1/4, let Λ c denote the collection of partitions λ of n with the property that either
e., the Young diagram λ contains at least (1 − c)n rows or contains at least (1 − c)n columns. Then, Roichman's upper bound implies that for every π ∈ S n and λ ∈ Λ c , and a universal constant α > 0,
On the other hand, both |Λ c | and the maximal dimension of representations in Λ c are small, as shown in the following Lemma of [13] .
Lemma 6 (Lemma 6.2 in [13]). Let p(n) denote the number of integer partitions of n. Then
To give a more concrete bound for the size of Λ c , we record the asymptotic formula for the partition function p(n) [4, pg. 45 
as n → ∞ . Now we are ready to prove the main result of this section, which is another application of Theorem 4. Proof. Let 2c < d < 1/2 be constants. We will apply Theorem 4 by setting S = Λ c and D = n dn . The condition 2c < d guarantees that D > d 2 S , since d S ≤ n cn by Lemma 6. First, we need to bound the maximal normalized character χ S (H). By (4), we have χ µ (H) ≤ e −αm for all µ ∈ S n \ S. Hence, χ S (H) ≤ e −αm .
To bound the second term in the upper bound of Theorem 4, as ∆ ≤ |S|, it suffices to bound:
for sufficiently large n, so long as
Now bounding the last term in the upper bound of Theorem 4:
n n e −n (n! > n n e −n by Stirling's approximation)
for sufficiently large n, so long as γ < 1 − 2d.
Theorem 7 generalizes Moore, Russell, and Schulman's result [13] on strong Fourier sampling over S n , which only applied in the case |H| = 2. To relate our result to the results of Kempe et al. [8] observe that, since log |S n | = Θ(n log n), the subgroup H is indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling if |H| 2 e −αm ≤ (n log n) −ω(1) , or equivalently, if m ≥ (2/α) log |H| + ω(log n).
Strong Fourier sampling and the McEliece cryptosystem
Our main application of Theorem 4 is to show the limitations of strong Fourier sampling in attacking the McEliece cryptosystem. Throughout this section, we fix system parameters n, k, q of the McEliece cryptosystem, and fix a k × n generator matrix M in a private-key of the system. Recall that the known possible quantum attack against this McEliece cryptosystem involves solving the HSP over the wreath product group (GL k (F q ) × S n ) ≀ Z 2 with the hidden subgroup being
for some hidden element s ∈ GL k (F q ) × S n . Here, H 0 is a subgroup of GL k (F q ) × S n given by
Let Aut(M) denote the automorphism group of the linear code generated by M. Observe that every element (A, P) ∈ H 0 must have P ∈ Aut(M). This allows us to control the maximal normalized characters on K through the minimal degree of Aut(M). Then applying Theorem 4, we show that The proof of Theorem 8 follows the technical ideas discussed in the Introduction. The details appear in Section 6. As q k 2 ≤ n an , we have log
In general, the size of the subgroup K depends on the size of the automorphism group Aut(M) and the column rank of the matrix M. To see this, we have |K| = 2|H 0 | 2 , and |H 0 | = |Aut(M)| × |Fix(M)|, where Fix(M) denotes the set of matrices in GL k (F q ) fixing M, i.e.,
To bound the size of Fix(M), we record an easy fact which can be obtained by the orbit-stabilizer formula.
Fact. Let r be the column rank of M.
Proof. WLOG, assume the first r columns of M are linearly independent, and each remaining column is a linear combination of the first r columns. Consider the action of GL k (F q ) on the set of k × n matrices over F q . Under this action, the orbit of the matrix M, denoted Orb(M), consists of all k × m matrices over F q such that the first r columns are linearly independent, and each j th column, for j > r, consists of the same linear combination of the first r columns as that of the j th column of the matrix M. Hence, the size of Orb(M) equals the number of k × r matrices over F q of column rank r.
. On the other hand, Fix(M) is the stabilizer of M. By the orbit-stabilizer formula, we have 
In the a case that the matrix M generates a rational Goppa code, then M has full rank and the automorphism group Aut(M) is isomorphic to a subgroup of the projective linear group PGL 2 (F q ), provided 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 2, by Stichtenoth's Theorem [21] Proof. (sketch) Since Aut(M) is isomorphic to a subgroup of PGL k (F q ), the proof is based on the observation that any transformation in PGL k (F q ) that fixes at least three distinct projective lines must be the identity.
By Corollary 9, the McEliece crytosystem coupled with rational Goppa codes resists known quantum attacks based on strong Fourier sampling. Unfortunately, this cryptosystem is insecure due to the classical attack by Sidelnokov and Shestakov [19] that recovers the secret scrambler A and the product MP, but does not reveal the secret permutation P. Of course, our next goal will be to find other classes of linear codes with which the McEliece cryptosystem would be secure against both classical and quantum attacks.
Strong Fourier sampling over GL 2 (F q )
In this simple application, we consider the finite general linear group G = GL 2 (F q ), whose structure as well as irreps are well established [4, §5.2] . From the character table of GL 2 (F q ), which can be found in Appendix C, we draw the following easy facts:
From the easy facts above for GL(2, q), it is natural to choose the set S in Theorem 4 to be the set of linear (i.e., 1-dimensional) representations, and choose the dimensional threshold D to be q − 1. However, since GL(2, q) has q − 1 linear representations, i.e., |S| = D, we can't upper bound ∆ by |S|. We prove the following lemma to provide a strong upper bound on ∆, which is, in this case, the maximal number of linear representations appearing in the decomposition of ρ ⊗ ρ * , for any nonlinear irrep ρ. Since χ σ (H) ≤ 2/(q − 1) for all nonlinear irrep σ , we have
To bound the second term in the bound of 4, we have ∆ ≤ 2 by Lemma 11 and d S = 1, thus
As |G| = (q − 1) 2 q(q + 1) and |L D | = |S| = q − 1, we have
In particular, H is indistinguishable by strong Fourier sampling over GL 2 (F q ) if |H| ≤ q δ for some δ < 1/2, because in that case we have D H ≤ 28q 2δ −1 ≤ log −c |GL 2 (F q )| for all constant c > 0.
Examples of indistinguishable subgroups.
As a specific example, consider a cyclic subgroup H b generated by a triangular unipotent matrix T (b) for any b = 0. Since T (b) k = T (kb) for any integer k ≥ 0, the order of H b is the least positive integer k such that kb = 0. In particular, the order of H b equals the characteristic of the finite field F q . Suppose q = p n for some prime number p and n > 2. Then F q has characteristic p, and hence,
Similarly, consider a subgroup H a,b generated by two distinct non-identity elements T (a) and T (b). Since elements of H a,b are of the form T (ka + ℓb) for k, ℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}, we have |H a,b | ≤ p 2 . Thus, the distinguishability of H a,b using strong Fourier sampling over GL 2 (F p n ) is O(p 4−n ). Clearly, both H b and H a,b are indistinguishable, for n sufficiently large. More generally, any subgroup generated by a constant number of triangular unipotent matrices is indistinguishable.
Bounding distinguishability
We now present the proof for the main theorem (Theorem 4) in details. Fixing a nontrivial subgroup H < G, we want to upper bound D H . Let us start with bounding the expectation over the random group element g ∈ G, for a fixed irrep ρ ∈ G:
Obviously we always have E H (ρ) ≤ 4. More interestingly, we have
The equation
in Appendix A) can be shown using Schur's lemma. From (7), we are motivated to bound the variance of Π ρ H g b 2 when g is chosen uniformly at random. We provide an upper bound that depends on the projection of the vector b ⊗ b * onto irreducible subspaces of ρ ⊗ ρ * , and on maximal normalized characters of σ on H for all irreps σ appearing in the decomposition of ρ ⊗ ρ * . Recall that the representation ρ ⊗ ρ * is typically reducible and can be written as an orthogonal direct sum of irreps ρ ⊗ ρ * = σ ∈ G a σ σ , where a σ ≥ 0 is the multiplicity of σ . Then I(ρ ⊗ ρ * ) consists of σ with a σ > 0, and we let Π ρ⊗ρ * σ denote the projection operator whose image is a σ σ , that is, the subspace spanned by all copies of σ . Our upper bound given in Lemma 13 below generalizes the bound given in Lemma 4.3 of [13] , which only applies to subgroups H of order 2.
Lemma 13. Let ρ be an irrep of G. Then for any vector
Proof of Lemma 13. Fix a vector b ∈ V ρ . To simplify notations, we shall write Π g as shorthand for Π ρ H g , and write gb for ρ(g)b. For any g ∈ G, we have
It follows that S g is real, and that
We have
Subtracting (8) by (9) yields
To bound the variance, we upper bound S 2 g for all g ∈ G. Since S g is real, applying Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
Proving similarly to Lemma 4.2 in [13] , one can express the second moment of the inner product b, g −1 hgb in terms of the projection of b ⊗ b * into the irreducible constituents of the tensor product representation ρ ⊗ ρ * . Specifically, for any h ∈ G, we have
It follows that
Back to our goal of bounding E H (ρ) using the bound in Lemma 13, the strategy will be to separate irreps appearing in the decomposition of ρ ⊗ ρ * into two groups, those with small dimension and those with large dimension, and treat them differently. If d σ is large, we shall rely on bounding χ σ (H). If d σ is small, we shall control the projection given by Π ρ⊗ρ * σ using the following lemma which was proved implicitly in [13] (its proof is also given in Appendix):
The method discussed above for bounding E H (ρ) is culminated into Lemma 15 below.
Lemma 15. Let ρ ∈ G be arbitrary and S ⊂ G be any subset of irreps that does not contain
Proof of Lemma 15. Combining Inequality (7) and Lemmas 13 give
Now we split additive items in the above upper bound into two groups separated by the set S. For the first group (large dimension),
For the second group (small dimension),
Summing the last bounds for the two groups yields
On the other hand, since E H (ρ) ≤ 4, we can assume H 2 χ S (H) ≤ 1, and thus χ S (H) ≤ 
where the last inequality is due to χ ρ (H) ≤ χ S (H) ≤ 1 2|H| . This completes the proof.
To apply this lemma, we should choose the subset S such that d 2 S ≪ d ρ , that is, S should consist of small dimensional irreps. Then applying Lemma 15 for all irreps ρ of large dimension, we can prove our general main theorem straightforwardly.
Proof of Theorem 4:
S , we must have ρ ∈ S. By Lemma 15,
Combining this with the fact that E H (ρ) ≤ 4 for all ρ ∈ L, we obtain
To complete the proof, it remains to bound Pr
Strong Fourier sampling over (GL
This section devotes to the proof of Theorem 8 which establishes the limitation of strong Fourier sampling in breaking the McEliece cryptosystem. The goal is to bound the distinguishability of the subgroup K defined in (5) of the wreath product (GL k (F q ) × S n ) ≀ Z 2 .
Normalized characters for
Firstly, we consider quantum Fourier sampling over the wreath product G ≀ Z 2 , for a general group G, with a hidden subgroup of the form
for some subgroup H 0 < G and some element s ∈ G. Again, the first thing we need to understand is the maximal normalized characters on K. Recall that all irreducible characters of G ≀ Z 2 are constructed in the following ways:
1. Each unordered pair of two non-isomorphic irreps σ , ρ ∈ G gives rise to an irrep of G ≀ Z 2 , denoted {ρ, σ }, with character given by:
The dimension of representation {ρ, σ } is equal to χ {ρ,σ } ((1, 1), 0) = 2d ρ d σ .
2. Each irrep ρ ∈ G gives rise to two irreps of G ≀ Z 2 , denoted {ρ} and {ρ} ′ , with characters given by:
Both representations {ρ} and {ρ} ′ have the same dimension equal d 2 ρ .
Clearly, the number of irreps of G ≀ Z is equal to | G| 2 /2 + 3| G|/2, which is no more than | G| 2 as long as G has at least three irreps. Now it is easy to determine the maximal normalized characters on subgroup K.
Proposition 16. For non-isormorphic irreps
So to bound the maximal normalized characters over K, we can turn to bounding the normalized characters on the subgroup H 0 and the dimension of an irrep of G.
Normalized characters for (GL
Recall that for the case of attacking McEliece cryptosystem, we have G = GL k (F q ) × S n and every element (A, P) ∈ H 0 has P ∈ Aut(M).
For τ ∈ GL k (F q ) and λ ∈ S n , let τ × λ denote the tensor product as a representation of GL k (F q ) × S n . Those tensor product representations τ ×λ are all irreps of GL k (F q )×S n . Since χ τ×λ (S π , π) = χ τ (S π )χ λ (π) and χ τ (S π ) ≤ 1 for all π ∈ S n , we have
As in the treatment for the symmetric group, we can bound the maximal normalized character χ λ (Aut(M)) based on the minimum support of non-identity elements in Aut(M), for any λ ∈ S n \ Λ c .
To complete bounding the maximal normalized characters on the subgroup K, it remains to bound the dimension of a representation τ × λ of the group GL k (F q ) × S n with λ ∈ S n \ Λ c . Since the dimension of τ × λ is
we prove the following lower bound for d λ .
Lemma 17. Let 0 < c ≤ 1/6 be a constant. Then there is a constant β > 0 depending only on c such that for sufficiently large n and for λ ∈ S n \ Λ c ,
Proof of Lemma 17 . Consider an integer partition of n, λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ t ), with both λ 1 and t less than (1− c)n.
) be the conjugate of λ , where
We label all the cells of the Young diagram of shape λ as c 1 , . . . , c n , in which c i is the i th cell from the left of the first row, for 1 ≤ i ≤ λ 1 .
The dimension of λ is determined by the hook length formula:
where hook(c i ) is the number of cells appearing in either the same column or the same row as the cell c i , excluding those that are above or the the left of c i . In particular,
Now we consider the case cn < λ 1 < (1 − c)n. Letλ = (λ 2 , . . . , λ t ), this is an integer partition of n − λ 1 whose Young diagram is obtained by removing the first row of λ . Applying the hook length formula forλ and the fact that dλ ≥ 1 gives us:
Then we have
On the other hand, we have
To upper bound the exponent in the last equation, we use Chebyshev's sum inequality, which states that for any increasing sequence a 1 ≥ a 2 ≥ . . . ≥ a k and any decreasing sequence
Since the sequence {λ ′ i − 1} is increasing and the sequence {1/(λ 1 − i + 1)} is decreasing, we get
Let r be a constant such that 1 < r/c < cn. Bounding 1/i ≤ 1 for all i ≤ r/c and bounding 1/i ≤ c/r for all i > r/c yields
Putting the pieces together, we get
Let 0 < δ < ln 1 1−c be a constant and choose r large enough so that e −1/r ≥ (1 − c)e δ . Then
Remark The lower bound in Lemma 17 is essentially tight. To see this, consider the hook of width (1 − c)n and of depth cn. This hook has dimension roughly equal n cn , which is no more than (e/c) cn .
Proof of Theorem 8
We are ready to prove Theorem 8.
Proof of Theorem 8.
To apply Theorem 4, let 0 < c < min {1/6, 1/4 − a} be a constant and S be the set of irreps of (GL k (F q ) × S n ) ≀ Z 2 of the forms {τ × λ , η × µ}, {τ × λ }, {τ × λ } ′ with τ, η ∈ GL k (F q ) and λ , µ ∈ Λ c , where Λ c is mentioned in Section 4.1. Firstly, we need upper bounds for χ S (K), |S|, and d S .
Since Aut(M) has minimal degree m, by Inequality (4) in Section 4.1, we have for all λ ∈ S n \ Λ c ,
Combining with Lemma 17 yields 2 and by Lemma 6, we have
To bound d S , we start with bounding the dimension of each representation in S.
where the first inequality follows Lemma 6. The last inequality holds because
Hence, the maximal dimension of a representation in the set S is
Let 4a + 4c < d < 1 be a constant and let γ 1 be any constant such that 0 < γ 1 < d − 4c − 4a. Now we set the dimension threshold D = n dn . From the upper bounds on |S| and d S , we get
Let L be the set of all irreps of (GL k (F q ) × S n ) ≀ Z 2 of dimension at least D. Bounding |L| by the number of irreps of (GL k (F q ) × S n ) ≀ Z 2 , which is no more than square of the number of irreps of
Hence, for sufficiently large n,
By Theorem 4, we have
for some constant γ > 0. This completes the proof.
Appendices
A Supplemental proofs for the main theorem Proposition 18. Let H < G and g be chosen from G uniformly at random. Then for ρ ∈ G and b ∈ B ρ ,
Proof. Schur's lemma asserts that if ρ is irreducible, the only matrices which commute with ρ(g) for all g are the scalars. Hence,
which implies that
A.1 Proof of Lemma 14
Proof of Lemma 14. Let L σ be the subspace of ρ ⊗ ρ * consisting of all copies of σ . Since B ρ is orthonormal,
Note that dim L σ is equal to d σ times the multiplicity of σ in ρ ⊗ ρ * . On the other hand, we have
B Rational Goppa codes
This part summarizes definitions and key properties of rational Goppa codes that would be useful in our analysis. Following Stichtenoth [21] , we shall describe Goppa codes in terms of algebraic function fields instead of algebraic curves. A complete treatment for this subject can be found in [22] .
A rational function field over F q is a field extension F q (x)/F q for some x transcendental over F q . Each element z ∈ F q (x) can be viewed as a function whose evaluation at a base field element a ∈ F q is determined as follows:
A Rieman-Roch space 4 in the rational function field F q (x)/F q is a subset of F q of the form
and some integer r. Note that L (r, g, h) is a vector space of dimension r + 1 over F q .
be nonzero coprime polynomials, and let r < n a nonnegative integer. Let γ 1 , . . . , γ n be n distinct elements in the field 5 F q such that g(γ i ) = 0 and h(γ i ) = 0 for all i. Then a rational Goppa code associated with g, h and γ i 's is defined by
Remark A classical binary Goppa code can be obtained by setting q = 2 m , r = n − deg g(x) − 1, and
and then intersecting the code C (γ 1 , . . . , γ n , r, g, h) with the vector space F n 2 (see [1] ). Generalized Reed-Solomon codes are a special case of rational Goppa codes in which the polynomials g(x) and h(x) are both constants. The rational Goppa code C (γ 1 , . . . , γ n , r, g, h) has a generator matrix:
Proposition 20. The matrix M 0 has full rank, that is, its column rank equals r + 1. Hence, every generator matrix of a rational Goppa code has full rank. 4 In terms of algebraic function fields, a Rieman-Roch space is defined in the association with a divisor of the function field F/K, where a divisor is a finite sum ∑ i n i P i with n i ∈ Z and P i 's being places of the function field. In the rational function field K(x)/K, we can show that every divisor can be written as rP ∞ + (z) for some integer r and some nonzero z ∈ K(x), where P ∞ is the infinite place (defined in [22, pg. 9] ), and (z) is the principal divisor of z. The space L (r, g, h) is indeed the Rieman-Roch space associated with the divisor rP ∞ + (z) with z = h(x)/g(x). 5 In the case r = deg h(x) − deg g(x), one can choose one of the points P i 's to be ∞. However, we rule out this case to keep the discussion simple.
Proof. It suffices to to show that the first r + 1 columns of M 0 are linearly independent. Equivalently, we show that the matrix N 0 below has nonzero determinant:
. . .
The first matrix in the above product is a Vandermonde matrix, which has nonzero determinant because γ i 's are distinct. The second matrix also has nonzero determinant because g(γ i ) = 0 for all i. Hence, N 0 has nonzero determinant.
An important property of rational Goppa codes is that in general their automorphisms are induced by projective transformations of the projective line. We will make this precise below. [23, pg. 53 ]) Let C be a code of length n. An automorphism of C is a permutation π ∈ S n which maps every word in C to a word in C by acting on the positions of the codewords. The set of all automorphisms of C forms a group called the automorphism group of C.
Definition. (See
In particular, an automorphism of C (γ 1 , . . . , γ n , r, g, h) is a permutation π ∈ S n such that
Remark Suppose M is a generator matrix for an [n, k]-linear code C over F q . Then a permutation π ∈ S n is an automorphism of C if and only if there is an invertible matrix A ∈ GL k (F q ) such that AMP π = P π , where P π denotes the permutation matrix corresponding to π. If M has full rank, there is exactly one such matrix A for each automorphism π of C.
Theorem 21 (Stichtenoth [21] ). Suppose 1 ≤ r ≤ n− 3. Then the automorphism group of the rational Goppa code C (γ 1 , . . . , γ n , r, g, h) is isomorphic to a subgroup of Aut(F q (x)/F q ).
Fact. The automorphism group of the rational function field F q (x)/F q is isomorphic to the projective linear group over F q . In notations, Aut(
Let C = C (γ 1 , . . . , γ n , r, g, h) be a rational Goppa code. To give an intuition for how the automorphism group of C is embedded in PGL 2 (F q ), consider a transformation σ ∈ PGL 2 (F q ) and view each element a ∈ F q as the projective line 
If, further, C (σ γ 1 , . . . , σ γ n , r, g, h) equals the original code C, then σ induces an automorphism of C. Stichtenoth's theorem establishes that every automorphism of C is induced by such a transformation in PGL 2 (F q ).
C Supplemental proofs for GL
In this part, we will first present a preliminary background on the structure of GL 2 (F q ) followed by description of its irreps. We refer readers to [4, §5.2] for the missing technical details in this part.
Viewing GL 2 (F q ) as the group of all F q -linear invertible endomorphisms of the quadratic extension F q 2 of F q , we have a large subgroup of GL 2 (F q ) that is isomorphic to F * q 2 via the identification:
To turn each map f ξ into a matrix form, we fix a basis {1, γ} of F q 2 as a vector space over F q . For each ξ ∈ F q 2 , writing ξ = ξ x,y = x + γy for some x, y ∈ F q , then the map f ξ corresponds to the matrix x γ 2 y y x , since f ξ (1) = x + γy and f ξ (γ) = γ 2 y + γx. Hence, we can rewrite the above identification as
For example, if q is odd, choose a generator ε of F * q , then ε must be non-square in F q , which implies that 1, √ ε form a basis of F q 2 as a vector space over F q . In such a case, we can define ξ x,y = x + y √ ε.
Conjugacy classes. Group GL 2 (F q ) has four types of conjugacy classes in Table C .1, with representatives described as follows: There are q 2 − 1 conjugacy classes, hence there are exactly q 2 − 1 irreps of GL 2 (F q ). We shall briefly describe below how to construct all those representations.
Linear representations. For each character α : F * q → C * of the cyclic group F * q , we have a one-dimensional representation U α of GL 2 (F q ) defined by:
To compute U α (d x,y ), we shall use the following fact:
Recall that there are q − 1 characters of F * q = ε corresponding to q − 1 places where the generator ε can be sent to. The linear representation U α 0 , where α 0 is the character sending ε to 1, is indeed the trivial representation, denoted U .
Irreducible representations by action on P 1 (F q ). GL 2 (F q ) acts transitively on the projective line P 1 (F q ) in the natural way:
in which the stabilizer of the infinite point [1 : 0] is the Borel subgroup B:
The permutation representation of GL 2 (F q ) given by this action on P 1 (F q ) has dimension q + 1 and decomposes into the trivial representation U and a q-dimensional representation V . The character of V is given as follows:
By checking χ V , χ V = 1, we see that V is irreducible. Hence, for each of the q − 1 characters α of
Irreducible representations induced from Borel subgroup B.
For each pair of characters α, β of F * q , there is a character of the subgroup B:
In other words, φ α,β is a one-dimensional representation of subgroup B. Let W α,β be the representation of GL 2 (F q ) induced by φ α,β . By computing characters, we have
• W α,α = U α ⊕V α , and
• W α,β is irreducible for α = β . Each of these representations has dimension equal the index of B in
There are ((q − 1) 2 − (q − 1))/2 = (q − 1)(q − 2)/2 distinct irreps of this type.
Irreducible representations by characters of F * q 2 . Let ϕ : F * q 2 → C * be a character of the cyclic group F * q 2 . Since F * q 2 can be viewed as a subgroup of GL 2 (F q ), we have the induced representation Indϕ, which is not irreducible. However, it gives us a (q − 1)-dimensional irrep with character given by
Note that Indϕ ≃ Indϕ q , thus X ϕ ≃ X ϕ q . So, the characters ϕ of F * q 2 with ϕ = ϕ q give a rise to the 1 2 q(q − 1) remaining irreps of GL 2 (F q ).
A summary of all irreducible characters of GL 2 (F q ) is given in 
C.2 Proof of Lemma 11
In the remaining of this section, we devote to prove Lemma 11, which states that there are at most two linear representations appearing in the decomposition of ρ ⊗ ρ * , for any irrep ρ of GL 2 (F q ). Obviously, if ρ is linear then ρ ⊗ ρ * is the trivial representation. Therefore, we shall only consider the cases where ρ is non-linear.
Recall that the multiplicity of U α in ρ ⊗ ρ * is given by Our goal below will be to show that χ ρ⊗ρ * , χ U α = 0 for all but two linear representations U α and for all non-linear irrep ρ of GL 2 (F q ). We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 22. Let F be a finite field and φ : F × → C * be a non-trivial character of the cyclic group F × , i.e., φ (x) = 1 for some x. Then ∑ x∈F × φ (x) = 0.
Proof. Let n be the order of F × and let τ be a generator of F × . Then τ n = 1 which implies φ (τ) n = 1. Since φ is non-trivial, we must have φ (τ) = 1. Hence,
Note that for any character α of F * q , the map α 2 : F * q → C * defined by α 2 (x) = α(x 2 ) is also a character of F * q . Hence, we have the following direct corollaries of Lemma 22. Proof. Observe that |χ ρ (a x )| and |χ ρ (b x )| do not depend on x, and χ U α (a x ) = χ U α (b x ) = α(x 2 ). Hence, to show A(ρ, α) = B(ρ, α) = 0, it suffices to use the fact that ∑ x∈F * q α(x 2 ) = 0.
Remark There are at most two characters α of F * q such that α 2 is trivial. They are the trivial one, and the one that maps ε → ω q− 1 2 if q is odd, where ω = e 2πi q−1 is a primitive (q − 1) th root of unity, and ε is a chosen generator of the cyclic group F * q . To see this, suppose α(ε) = ω k , for some k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 2}. If α(ε) 2 = 1, then ω 2k = 1, which implies q − 1 | 2k because ω has order q − 1. Hence 2k ∈ {0, q − 1}.
With this remark, Lemma 11 will immediately follows Lemma 25 below.
Lemma 25. Let ρ be a non-linear irrep of GL 2 (F q ) and let α be a character of F * q such that α 2 is trivial. Then U α does not appear in the decomposition of ρ ⊗ ρ * .
Proof. We will prove case by case of ρ that C(ρ, α) = D(ρ, α) = 0, which, together with Corollary 24, will complete the proof for the lemma. where in the last equality, we apply Corollary 23 and the fact that ξ q+1 x,0 = x q+1 = x 2 for all x ∈ F * q . Consider the map φ : F * q 2 → C * given by φ (ξ ) = α(ξ q+1 ). Clearly, φ is a character of F * q 2 . Since α 2 is non-trivial and α 2 (x) = α(x 2 ) = α(x q+1 ) = φ (x) for all x ∈ F * q , the map φ is also non-trivial. By Lemma 22, we have ∑ ξ ∈F * The last thing we want to show is that D 1 = 0. Consider the map φ : F * q 2 → C * given by φ (ξ ) = ϕ(ξ q−1 )α(ξ q+1 ), which is apparently a character of F * q 2 . We shall see that it is non-trivial. Let ω be a generator of F * q 2 . Since ω q 2 −1 = 1, we have φ (ω q+1 ) = α(ω (q+1) 2 ) = α(ω 2(q+1) ) = α 2 (ω q+1 ). On the other hand, ω q+1 is a generator for F * q , because ω k(q+1) with k = 0, 1, . . . , q − 2 are distinct, and ω (q−1)(q+1) = 1. Hence, if φ (ω q+1 ) = 1, then α 2 (x) = 1 for all x ∈ F * q . But since α 2 is non-trivial, we must have φ (ω q+1 ) = 1, which means φ is non-trivial. Applying Lemma 22, we get ∑ ξ ∈F * 
